I present Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-domination interpreted through the experiences of Frederick Douglass in the antebellum American South. Douglass’ accounts of slaves experiencing freedom, the (un)freedom of the slave owners, and what it took to attain the status of a free man counsel readers to interpret the experience and status of a slave without removing his or her agency entirely. Pettit’s conception of republican liberty understates the role of agency in determining the extent of freedom on the part of the dominated person. Domination consists in the substitution of the will of the dominated party with the will of the dominating party, but by understanding Douglass’ and others‘ personal efforts as a sort of nonviolent resistance in the vein of Gandhi’s Satyagraha, we may understand the status of the slave as affected not only by the masters’ power of interference, but also by the slaves’ ability to resist, even if only in small ways. This is not to say that the slaves’ status as dominated is fully—or even mostly—within their control. I propose merely to understand freedom as non-domination through the experiences of antebellum American slaves. In doing so, I develop two interconnected heuristics: a two-dimensional conception of republican and liberal liberty, and the idea of freedom as humanization, which seems to undergird Douglass’ conception and experiences of liberty. I use these to connect and interpret Douglass’ experiences with Pettit’s neo-Roman conception.