This study presents a brief exploration into the Court constructs its opinions under conditions that favor non-compliance by the executive branch. Previous research suggests that the Supreme Court behaves differently when the justices have reason to fear that their policies will not be implemented, or implemented unfaithfully, by executive actors. Another body of research suggests that the Court uses clear language to enhance the chances for compliance when dealing with other government agents, whereas other work suggests that the Court obfuscates its opinion language to protect itself from the political consequences of noncompliance. I propose to find evidence for these competing theories by using the LIWC content-analysis software of Supreme Court majority opinions in lateral cases. The evidence I find is mixed between the two theories, but tends to support the clarity model. I also find evidence that the Court’s opinions reflect awareness of its weakened position in lateral cases, when ideological distance between the Court and President, which favors nonimplementation, is high.